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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(n) Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Rule 3(a), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The trial court was correct in ruling that Maria 's evidence failed to 
demonstrate that the costs of private school and a car for the parties' minor child 
were reasonablely necessary expenses sufficient to set child support above the top 
guideline. 
Standard of Review. The amount of child support set by the trial court is 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. BaJ] v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996). 
Issue Preserved. This point is in Monte's capacity as Appellee, and as such, 
Maria has preserved it. In addition, Monte presented the trial court with his 
supporting case law of Reinhartv. Reinhart. 963 P.2d 757 (Utah App. 1998) and 
Ball v. Peterson. 912 P. 2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996) during opening argument. Tr. pp. 
7-8..R., p.201. 
2. The trial court was correct in ruling that Maria failed to show a basis for 
modifying the allocation of the child tax exemption claim 
Standard of Review. A denial of a modification of a child support type 
provision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Ball v. Peterson. 912 P. 2d 1006 
(Utah App. 1996). 
Issue Preserved. This point is in Monte's capacity as Appellee and, as such, 
Maria has preserved it. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the trial court's denial of Maria's Verified Petition to Modify 
Decree of Divorce, filed March 3,2005. An Order To Show Cause Hearing was held 
on April 11, 2005, at which the parties stipulated to a temporary increase in Monte's 
child support obligation from $637 per month to $826 per month. This was not based 
on any income figure for the parties- rather, it was by stipulation. 
On September 25, 2006, the matter was tried to the Honorable Ernie W. 
Jones, District Judge. Judge Jones denied Maria's request to increase Monte's child 
support obligation beyond the previously stipulated $826 per month, and in general, 
denied Maria all relief for which she had prayed, in the Judge's Memorandum 
Decision dated October 5, 2006. 
An Order on Respondent's Petition To Modify Child Support Provisions of 
Decree of Divorce was entered on December 5, 2006. Maria filed her Notice of 
Appeal on December 26, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. The parties were divorced January 3, 1991. Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce, Rat pp. 1-3. In the Decree, Maria was awarded custody of their minor child, 
Casey Jordan Bambrough born March, 1990 and Monte was ordered to pay child 
support of $350 per month. Decree, paragraphs #3 and 10, R. pp. 2-3. 
2. On July 7, 1998, the parties, through counsel, stipulated to a child 
support increase to $637 per month, based upon Maria's then imputed income of 
$1000 per month gross, and Monte's then actual income of $6901 per month gross. 
Stipulated Order, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7; R. pp. 21-22. The parties' combined 
2 
incomes were still within the child support guideline limits. 
3. On March 3, 2005, Maria filed a Verified Petition To Modify Decree of 
Divorce. R., pp. 28-34. She basically sought to increase Monte's child support 
obligation from $637 per month to $2500 per month, based on two main alleged 
changes in circumstances: (1) that Monte was averaging $20,123.45 per month 
gross income, Petition To Modify, paragraph #7;R.p. 29; and (2) that Casey now 
had increased reasonable expenses because she was attending private high school 
at Xavier College Preparatory Academy. Petition To Modify , paragraph #11; R., p. 
30. She also asked for Monte to pay for one half of any expenses relating to 
providing Casey with a car and car insurance, not to exceed $500 per month, once 
Casey reached 16 years of age (Casey was not quite 15 when Maria filed the 
present Petition To Modify and not even driving yet). Petition To Modify, paragraph 
(f); R-, P-33. 
4. Casey was a straight A student in public school in the 8th and 9th 
grades. Maria's testimony, Tr. p.52 lines 19-25 R., p. 201;. Monte's Trial Exhibit 
#1 ,R.p 200. Maria's decision to move Casey from the public schools to an extremely 
expensive private school was based purely on Maria's feelings and not on its being 
necessary. Maria's Testimony, Tr. pp. 52-55; R., p.201. 
5. Casey could have walked to her public high school, taken the bus or 
Maria could have driven her, as it was only one and a half miles from their home. 
Maria's Testimony Tr. p. 56, line 25 - p. 57, line 22; R., p. 201. Maria's decision to 
purchase a car for Casey's transportation was solely due to her unilateral decision 
to send her to the costly private school, which was 22 miles from home. Maria's 
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Testimony, Tr. p. 56 line 22 - p. 57 , line 22; R., p.201. Maria did not even purchase 
the car until August, 2006, some 17 months after she filed the present modification 
proceedings. Maria's Testimony, Tr. page 62, line 10 - line 24; R., p.201. 
6. At trial, other than testifying to the cost of private school and car 
expenses, Maria presented no evidence of Casey's reasonable needs- no evidence 
concerning the costs of housing, food, clothing, extracurricular activities, hobbies, 
medical, dental or other health-related expenses. Instead, in direct response to 
Judge Jones's question as to how she came up with a child support figure of $2500 
per month, she indicated it was "...[bjased pretty much on a percentage of... Mr. 
Bambrough's monthly income..." Tr. p. 105, line 21- p.106, line 4; R., p.201. 
7. Casey turns 18 in March, 2008, and her high school class graduates in 
May, 2008. Maria's Testimony TR. p.55, lines 12-16; R.,p. 201. The additional 
classes Casey takes are not necessary for her high school diploma, and are just 
early college classes. Maria's Testimony, Tr. p. 55, line 23 - p.56, line 3; R., p. 201. 
8. Judge Jones found that Monte's gross income was $15,739 per 
month, and that Maria's average for 2001-2005 was $3795 per month. Memorandum 
Decision, paragraphs #2-4; R.,p.169. At the time of trial, Maria was only earning 
$1733 per month gross. Maria's Testimony, Tr.p.50, lines 4-10. 
9. Judge Jones also found that the evidence presented did not establish 
an increase in reasonable needs for Casey or that Casey needed to be in private 
school, or that a car was a necessary expense for her. Memorandum Decision, 
R.p.170.0. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 78-45-7.12, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, states that 
when the parties' adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level in the Base 
Combined Child Support Obligation Table (Section 78-45-7.14), an appropriate and 
just child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by-case basis, not to be less 
than the highest level specified in the table. In the case of one child, that amount is 
$826 per month - the amount ordered by the trial court in this case. To go above 
that top guideline amount, the trial court must make findings on a child's reasonable 
needs and all appropriate and just factors. Ball v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah 
App. 1996). 
Maria advocates the applicability of Section 78-45-7(3), Utah Code Annotated, 
as amended. That Section applies only when there has been introduced sufficient 
evidence to rebut the guidelines, which implies that the parties' incomes are within 
the guidelines. Otherwise, the trial court's decision is to be on a case-by-case basis 
pursuant to Section 78-45-7.12. Baker v Baker. 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993), 
with no mandatory listing of criteria. 
The main thrust of Maria's argument is that Casey's expenses of private 
school and a car are necessary, and that she (Maria) need not have presented any 
other evidence of Casey's reasonable needs (such as housing, food, clothing, 
extracurricular activities/hobbies, medical, dental or other health-related expenses)-
rather she needed only to show Monte's income. Judge Jones's finding that Maria 
simply opted to place Casey in a private school, but that there was no evidence 
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presented that she needed to be in a private school, because she did well in the 
public school, supports his determination that the private school was not a 
reasonable need. See Statement of Facts #4, this Brief. Maria does not challenge 
that finding, but rather, merely points to other evidence that supports her view that 
private school was a reasonable need. Judge Jones did not abuse his discretion in 
finding that it was not reasonably necessary. Bail v. Peterson, supra. Similarly Judge 
Jones's finding that a car was not a necessary expense for Casey was supported 
by the evidence and not an abuse of his discretion. See Statement of Facts #5, this 
Brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
SETTING CHILD SUPPORT AT THE TOP GUIDELINE 
AMOUNT OF $826 PER MONTH. 
Section 78-45-7.12, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, provides: 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the 
highest level specified in the table, an appropriate and just 
child support amount shall be ordered on a case-by case 
basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the 
highest level specified in the table for the number of 
children due support. 
To go above the top guideline amount, the trial court must make findings on a child's 
reasonable needs and all appropriate and just factors. BaN v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 
1006 (Utah App. 1996). 
The main thrust of Maria's argument is that Casey's private school costs and 
car costs are necessary expenses, and that she (Maria) need not have presented 
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any other evidence of Casey's reasonable needs, e.g., housing, food, clothing, 
extracurricular activities/hobbies, medical, dental, or other health-related expenses. 
Rather, she only needed to show Monte's gross income and take a percentage of 
that. See Statement of Facts #6., this Brief. Judge Jones rejected this argument, 
finding that the evidence did not show that Casey needed to be in private school, 
because she had done well in public school, nor did the evidence show that a car 
was a necessary expense for Casey. These findings are supported by the evidence. 
See Statement of Facts, #4 and 5, this Brief. 
The setting of child support is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial 
court. Durfee v. Durfee, 796 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990) and this is so even when the 
parties' combined gross monthly incomes are in excess of the guideline table set 
forth in Section 78-45-7.14, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. Bail v. Peterson. 
912 P.2d1006. (Utah App. 1996). In addition, in child support cases where parental 
income exceeds the guidelines, the parties must introduce evidence to establish the 
reasonable needs of a child, and a demonstration of an increase in the obligor's 
income alone is not sufficient. Reinhart v. Reinhart. 963 P.2d 757 (Utah App. 1998). 
In the present case, Judge Jones found that the school costs and car costs 
were not necessary, based on the evidence. Maria does not challenge these 
findings, but instead points to other evidence she presented- basically that in her 
opinion, these are necessary expenses. However, it is incumbent upon Maria to 
demonstrate that Judge Jones's finding was not supported by the evidence and she 
has not done so. 
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Rather, Maria contends that Judge Jones erred by not considering evidence 
she entered, or tried to enter, under Section 78-45-7(3), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, citing Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993). However, the Baker 
holding itself makes it clear that this section only applies to cases where the parties' 
incomes are within the guideline amounts, and the guidelines are then rebutted. 
In Baker, the father's income alone $150,120 per year, an amount exceeding 
the statutory guideline amounts. The trial court set support for the children at $1600. 
per month, higher than the top guideline amount for two children of $1400 per 
month. On appeal, Mrs. Baker contended that the trial court, in determining an 
appropriate and just child support amount under Section 78-45-7.12 (above the 
guideline incomes) must consider all the factors set forth in Section 78-45-7(3) 
(rebutting the guidelines), just as Maria argues in her Brief. 
The Court of Appeals rejected this very holding: 
... However, by the very language of that section [78-
45-7(3)], a trial court need consider these 
enumerated factors only when there is sufficient 
evidence to rebut the guidelines set forth in section 
78-45-7.14. In the case at bar, since the award of 
child support was beyond the amount listed in the 
statutory guidelines, neither party's proposed award 
even addressed, much less rebutted the guidelines. 
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in declining to 
address the factors listed in section 78-45-7(3). 866 
P.2d 540, at 545. 
Thus, Section 78-45-7(3) applies only in cases where the parties' combined 
incomes are within the guidelines and one of the parties seeks to rebut their 
applicability. That is not the case here. Maria's argument that she was prevented 
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form presenting evidence under this section fails, because the section does not 
apply. She had to prove that the amount of child support sought was for the 
reasonably necessary expense of Casey's support. This she did not do. Not only did 
she not persuade the trial court under Section 78-45-7.12, but her argument that the 
guideline rebuttal criteria of Section 78-45-7(3) apply is not supported by the case 
law. 
In addition, Maria argued at trial that she was entitled to an increase based on 
a percentage of Monte's income , see Statement of Facts #6, this Brief. Such a 
position is analogous to the linear extrapolation prohibited by Bali v Peterson 
("...Strict reliance on linear extrapolation would be erroneous, because taken to the 
extreme, a child could be awarded support vastly exceeding any reasonable need." 
Ball v. Peterson. 912 P.2d 1006, at 1014.) 
Maria's citation of Jeffries v. Jeffries. 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1998) is 
inapposite, because Jeffries was a pre-guideline case decided in 1988, and the 
guidelines apply only to cases establishing or modifying child support on or after July 
1,1989. Section 78-45-7.2(1), Utah Code Annotated, as amended. Her citation to Hill 
v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992) is also distinguishable, because the Hjii 
holding relied on Jeffries, a pre-guideline case. The HNI income figures were also 
clearly within the guideline amounts. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT 
MARIA FAILED TO SHOW A BASIS FOR MODIFYING 
THE ALLOCATION OF THE CHILD TAX EXEMPTION 
CLAIM. 
Maria argues that, under Section 78-47.21, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, she is entitled to modify the divorce decree's allocation of the child tax 
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exemption claim entitlement, because she pays so much of Casey's expenses, 
arguing that this is a change in circumstances. She does not mention that she only 
earns $1733 per month gross currently because she changed jobs. Maria's 
Testimony, Tr. p.50, lines 4-10. She also presented no analysis to the trial court of 
how much asserting the tax exemption claim was worth to her as compared to what 
it was worth to Monte, Section 78-45-7.21 (2)(b); what the parties' circumstances 
were when the Decree was entered originally; or any other evidence that there has 
been a material and substantial change in circumstances. Judge Jones was 
therefore correct in ruling that Maria failed to show a basis for modifying the 
allocation of the child tax exemption claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The trail court was within the sound exercise of its discretion when it ruled that 
Maria failed to prove that either an expensive private school or a car expense in the 
future, was necessary for Casey's support. Judge Jones followed correctly the 
requirements of Section 78-45-7.12 when he modified the previous child support 
award, setting it at the top guideline amount. 
Marie also requests that the case be remanded for further findings and 
evidence. She is not entitled to that relief. Judge Jones's decision should be 
affirmed, with no attorney fee award. 
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